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Commentary: The Adoption of Comparative Negligence in Maryland? 
T he time is more than ripe for Maryland to abolish the outdated tenets of contributory negligence 
and join with her forty-five sister states in 
adopting the modern doctrine of compar-
ative negligence. Currently, Maryland 
law embodies the doctrine of contributory 
negligence, the "all or nothing rule," that 
bars recovery to an injured plaintiff who 
is found to be even a scintilla at fault. The 
Maryland Court of Appeals has again left 
it up to the legislature to initiate a change 
in the law by refusing to adopt compara-
tive negligence in Harrison v. Montgomery 
County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456 
A.2d 894 (1983) (quadriplegic student de-
nied recovery after failing to properly 
execute a front flip in his school gym-
nasium). The 1986 Maryland Legislature 
must adopt the modified form of com-
parative negligence proposed in Senate 
Bill 589 (SB 589, 1986 Sess.) ("SB 589") in 
order to remedy the inequities evidenced 
by Harrison and abolish a law that is pa-
tently unfair. 
Senate Bill 589 plans to adopt the modi-
fied form of comparative negligence that 
would not permit a person's contributory 
negligence to be a complete bar to recovery 
if the contributory negligence was less than 
the negligence of the person against whom 
recovery is sought. One's damage award 
would be diminished in the proportion of 
the percentage of contributory negligence 
attributable to that person. Senate Bill 589 
remains unchanged from similar bills that 
have failed in the past two legislative ses-
sions. However, significant progress has 
been made by our legislature in these last 
two sessions since the introduction of such 
a bill nearly twenty years ago. Two years 
ago marked the first time that the bill 
moved out of the Senate and the first time 
since 1968 that a comparative negligence 
bill moved from one house to the other 
(dying in the House Judiciary Committee 
by a vote of 12 to 9). Last year's bill passed 
on the Senate floor (41-3) then passed in 
the House Judiciary Committee (12-9) be-
fore being defeated on the House floor by a 
narrow margin (66-53). The 1986 legisla-
ture must complete the trend toward adopt-
ing comparative negligence. 
Why would forty-five states convert to 
comparative negligence except for the basic 
premise that the law of contributory neg-
ligence is outdated and its "all or nothing" 
approach is patently unfair? These strong 
policy reasons must be kept in the fore-
front of each legislator's decision-making 
process. The major threats to SB 589 are 
the skepticism over jury verdicts, the threat 
of increased litigation, the powerful insur-
ance lobby, and the effects on other areas 
of tort law. 
Generally, the skepticism over jury ver-
dicts is unfounded. There has been no de-
pendable evidence from any state that has 
adopted a comparative negligence standard 
that juries have had any difficulty appor-
tioning harm by percentages to the respec-
tive parties. In fact, SB 589 provides for an 
explanatory jury instruction. Juries have 
the knowledge to understand the ramifica-
tions of their decisions before apportion-
ing fault. Opponents to SB 589 have argued 
that, under our present system, juries ap-
ply a rough comparative negligence stan-
dard and compromise their verdicts. Op-
ponents say, "Why fix a machine that is 
not broken?" This goes against the funda-
mental policies of our judicial system. 
Judges give instructions to be adhered to, 
not compromised. Even if this rough com-
parative negligence standard is true, many 
actionable claims that would go to the jury 
under a comparative negligence standard 
are not given the chance under the contrib-
utory negligence standard due to summary 
judgments and directed verdicts. Further-
more, many claims are never filed because 
the injured person is slightly at fault. 
Injured plaintiffs maintaining meritorious 
claims must be given access to the courts 
instead of being thwarted by the law of 
contributory negligence. 
The second apparent concern is the 
threat of increased litigation. Because the 
adoption of a comparative negligence stan-
dard is a recent phenomenon, there has not 
been sufficient research on its effects. It is 
important to note that SB 589 only provides 
recovery to one whose negligence is less 
than the negligence of the person against 
whom recovery is sought. Therefore, the 
"less than" standard may inhibit fraudu-
lent claims for fear that the person bring-
ing suit may be found to be more at fault 
and subject to a counterclaim by the op-
posing party. Hence, there is an inherent 
mechanism to insure that only valid claims 
may increase. Justice requires and encour-
ages the maintenance of valid claims. Fur-
thermore, no significant increase in litiga-
tion has been noted by any comparative 
negligence state. 
A third concern comes from the power-
ful insurance lobby. These opponents to 
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the comparative negligence standard argue 
that the number of claims and the number 
of successful claims will increase, thereby 
causing an increase in rates. It must be em-
phasized that there is no dependable data 
to support the insurance lobbyists' conten-
tions. Our Maryland Legislature must shy 
away from the unsubstantiated fears of the 
strong insurance lobby and lean toward a 
statute that benefits the well-being of the 
citizens of our State. If insurance com-
panies will be affected by comparative 
negligence at all, it is by set-offs; that is, 
set-offs will play an important role in the 
ultimate division of damages. 
Finally, there are concerns that other 
areas of tort law such as strict liability in 
tort, assumption of risk, last clear chance 
and settlements by joint tortfeasors will be 
affected if comparative negligence legisla-
tion is adopted. However, as Judge Rita 
Davidson stated in her dissent in Harrison, 
any discrepancies with any other areas of 
tort law can be adequately resolved by our 
judicial system if not legislatively cor-
rected. Just as was done in every other 
comparative negligence state, Maryland 
can effect a needed tort reform by a smooth 
legislative and judicial transition. 
The time for change is now. Legislative 
action must be taken in this 1986 session 
in order to remedy the obvious inequities 
inherent in the doctrine of contributory 
negligence. Opponents ofSB 21 have not 
adequately substantiated their reasons 
against acceptance of a comparative negli-
gence standard so as to outweigh the rea-
sons for its adoption. Juries will be able to 
apportion fault, only meritorious claims 
will increase, no attributable rise in insur-
ance rates has been noted by any other 
comparative negligence state, and a smooth 
tort reform can be accomplished. Let us 
join our 45 sister states in adopting the 
doctrine of comparative negligence and 
abolish a rule that is patently unfair. 
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